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Economic Factors in a Model of Voting: The Case of The Netherlands, Great Britain, and Israel

Author

Listed:
  • Alexei Zakharov
  • Dean Fantazzini

    (Moscow School of Economics – Moscow State University)

Abstract

A spatial model of voting in parliamentary elections is estimated by using survey data from The Netherlands, Great Brit-ain, and Israel. It is shown that more educated voters put more weight on the parties’ political programs. The choice of less educated voters depends primarily on their social and economic status. In the case of Israel, observance of religions traditions plays the same role as education in European countries: the more secular is the voter, the greater is the impact of the party’s policy platform on his choice

Suggested Citation

  • Alexei Zakharov & Dean Fantazzini, 2009. "Economic Factors in a Model of Voting: The Case of The Netherlands, Great Britain, and Israel," Applied Econometrics, Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 14(2), pages 57-73.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:apltrx:0115
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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