Securing the base: electoral competition under variable turnout
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Mandler, Michael, 2013. "How to win a large election," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 44-63.
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More about this item
KeywordsSpatial competition; Abstention;
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
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