Political-economic problems in trade capacity building
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 4 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/business/sociology/journal/11558|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994.
"Protection for Sale,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1997. "An Economic Theory of GATT," NBER Working Papers 6049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bagwell,K. & Staiger,R.W., 1998. "An economic theory of GATT," Working papers 15, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Hoekman, Bernard, 2002. "Strengthening the global trade architecture for development: the post Doha agenda," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 23-45, March.
- Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
- Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Edward J Green & Robert H Porter, 1997. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1147, David K. Levine.
- Chad P. Bown, 2004. "Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 59-80, 01.
- Smith, James McCall, 2000. "The Politics of Dispute Settlement Design: Explaining Legalism in Regional Trade Pacts," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(01), pages 137-180, December.
- Henson, Spencer & Loader, Rupert, 2001. "Barriers to Agricultural Exports from Developing Countries: The Role of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 85-102, January.
- Hoekman, Bernard, 2002. "Strengthening the global trade architecture for development," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2757, The World Bank.
- Hoekman, Bernard M, 2002. "Strengthening the global trade architecture for development," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 34902, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
- Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "Foreign aid and rent-seeking," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 437-461, August.
- Svensson, Jakob, 1998. "Foreign aid and rent-seeking," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1880, The World Bank.
- Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
- Chad P. Bown, 2005. "Participation in," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 19(2), pages 287-310.
- Krishna, Pravin & Panagariya, Arvind, 2000. "A unification of second best results in international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 235-257, December.
- Ludema, Rodney D., 2001. "Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement procedures," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 355-376, June.
- Ludema, R.D., 1990. "Optimal International Trade Agreements And Dispute Settlement Procedures," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9101, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
- Keohane, Robert O., 1986. "Reciprocity in international relations," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(01), pages 1-27, December.
- Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann & Thierry Verdier, 2007. "Aid and trade," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 481-507, Autumn.
- Thierry Verdier & Akiko Suwa-Eisenmann, 2007. "Aid and Trade," Post-Print halshs-00754208, HAL.
- SUWA-EISENMANN Akiko & VERDIER Thierry, 2007. "Aid and trade," Research Unit Working Papers 0709, Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquee, INRA.
- Suwa Eisenmann, Akiko & Verdier, Thierry, 2007. "Aid and Trade," CEPR Discussion Papers 6465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Koremenos, Barbara & Lipson, Charles & Snidal, Duncan, 2001. "The Rational Design of International Institutions," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(04), pages 761-799, September.
- Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
- J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler, 2000. "Implementation of Urugauy Round Commitments: The Development Challenge," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(04), pages 511-525, 04. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:4:p:329-359. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.