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Academic commercialization and changing nature of academic cooperation

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  • Sotaro Shibayama

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Abstract

Recent economic policies emphasize the role of academic science in technological innovation and economic growth and encourage universities and individual academics to engage in commercial activities. In this trend of academic commercialization, a growing concern has been expressed that its potential incompatibility with the traditional norms of open science could undermine the cooperative climate in academia. Drawing on the framework of evolution of the cooperation, this study examines the changing nature of academic cooperation under the current policy trend. In an ideal state of open science, academics are supposed to cooperate gratis and unconditionally. However, results predict that the commercialized regime could compromise underlying mechanisms of cooperation and allow defectors to prevail. As the trend further grows, academics would become more demanding of direct reward in exchange for cooperation, and they would refrain from engaging in cooperation but would prefer to work independently. Some interventions (e.g., centralized rewarding) could mitigate the problem but require delicate system design. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Sotaro Shibayama, 2015. "Academic commercialization and changing nature of academic cooperation," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 513-532, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:25:y:2015:i:2:p:513-532
    DOI: 10.1007/s00191-014-0387-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Fudickar, Roman & Hottenrott, Hanna & Lawson, Cornelia, 2016. "What’s the price of consulting? Effects of public and private sector consulting on academic research," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 201603, University of Turin.
    2. Vicente-Saez, Ruben & Martinez-Fuentes, Clara, 2018. "Open Science now: A systematic literature review for an integrated definition," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 428-436.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Indirect reciprocity; Evolution of cooperation; Social norms; Open science; Academic commercialization; Academic Entrepreneurship; Evolutionary game theory; I23; L26; O33; C73; O38;

    JEL classification:

    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

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