Executive compensation: a calibration approach
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More about this item
KeywordsCalibration · Executive compensation · Principal-agent.;
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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