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Notes on behavioral economics and labor market policy

  • Linda Babcock

    ()

  • William Congdon

    ()

  • Lawrence Katz

    ()

  • Sendhil Mullainathan

    ()

Labor market policies succeed or fail at least in part depending on how well they reflect or account for behavioral responses. Insights from behavioral economics, which allow for realistic deviations from standard economic assumptions about behavior, have consequences for the design and functioning of labor market policies. We review key implications of behavioral economics related to procrastination, difficulties in dealing with complexity, and potentially biased labor market expectations for the design of selected labor market policies including unemployment compensation, employment services and job search assistance, and job training. Copyright Babcock et al.; licensee Springer. 2012

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1186/2193-9004-1-2
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Article provided by Springer in its journal IZA Journal of Labor Policy.

Volume (Year): 1 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
Pages: 1-14

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Handle: RePEc:spr:izalpo:v:1:y:2012:i:1:p:1-14:10.1186/2193-9004-1-2
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