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Behavioural politics: social insurance and mutual benefit in Robert Sugden’s The Community of Advantage

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  • Francesco Guala

    (Università Degli Studi Di Milano)

Abstract

In The Community of Advantage, Robert Sugden advocates a system of universal social insurance to ensure that all citizens enjoy the benefits of market institutions. The Community of Advantage however does not shed light on the extent of redistribution that social insurance should provide. While the criterion of mutual advantage seems to licence only a minimal level of insurance, people’s expectations and collective bargaining power are likely to lead to a much more extensive redistribution. This is not necessarily a bad thing, since a well-functioning society is more than a well-functioning market economy. An extensive social insurance protects the rich, the poor, and, above all, the cooperative attitudes without which a democratic society cannot function well.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Guala, 2021. "Behavioural politics: social insurance and mutual benefit in Robert Sugden’s The Community of Advantage," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 68(1), pages 89-100, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:68:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s12232-020-00353-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-020-00353-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Contractarianism; Justice; Social insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D9 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics

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