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Concessions or Crackdown: How Regime Stability Shapes Democratic Responses to Hostage taking Terrorism

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  • Aslihan Saygili

Abstract

A prominent view in the terrorism literature is that democracies make soft targets for terrorists due to their citizenry’s low tolerance for civilian casualties. This study tests this claim in the context of hostage taking terrorism, which is a unique form of violence that coerces the target state into negotiating over its citizens’ lives under public scrutiny. I argue that democratic accountability generates softer responses to hostage crises only in mature democracies, where leaders’ concern over being held accountable for the human costs of a no-concessions policy outweighs the reputational costs of conceding to terrorists’ demands. Using data on government responses to hostage incidents from 1978 to 2005, I find that regime type becomes a significant predictor of target concessions only at higher levels of regime stability. To test the accountability mechanism proposed by theory, I examine the effect of electoral cycles on target response; as expected, while nearing elections soften democratic responses to hostage crises, in general their positive effect on the likelihood of concessions is stronger in consolidated democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Aslihan Saygili, 2019. "Concessions or Crackdown: How Regime Stability Shapes Democratic Responses to Hostage taking Terrorism," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 63(2), pages 468-501, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:63:y:2019:i:2:p:468-501
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002717736109
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