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Deterrence and Bargaining

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  • R. Harrison Wagner

    (Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract

Recent disputes about whether nuclear superiority still has any meaning raise the question of what relation exists between threats of nuclear punishment and bargaining power. This article argues that deterrence theory has provided little assistance in discussing that question. It has often focused exclusively on the defender's influence on the decision calculus of the aggressor or on the problem of avoiding a “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.†When it has touched on the question of bargaining advantage, it has used inappropriate models and failed to draw correct conclusions from the models it has used. The article outlines the main ways in which deterrence theory must be corrected, focusing especially on the distinction between two kinds of threats whose implications for bargaining are quite different.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Harrison Wagner, 1982. "Deterrence and Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 26(2), pages 329-358, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:26:y:1982:i:2:p:329-358
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002782026002007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1972. "A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 80-106, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vicki Bier & Naraphorn Haphuriwat, 2011. "Analytical method to identify the number of containers to inspect at U.S. ports to deter terrorist attacks," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 137-158, July.
    2. Konstantin Sonin, 2008. "A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 163-183, May.

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