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The Few Notes on Universal Suffrage Morality
[Несколько Заметок О Моральности Всеобщей Избирательной Привилегии]

Author

Listed:
  • Yanovskiy, Konstantin E. (Яновский, Константин)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

  • Zhavoronkov, Sergei V. (Жаворонков, Сергей)

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

Abstract

The Universal Suffrage introduction and subsequent rising of welfare state (nanny state) make the institution vulnerable to critics from the point of view of economists. Universal suffrage caused chronic budget deficit and increasing public debt burden during peacetime. Universal Suffrage defense is usually based on the following two claims: Universal Suffrage is an integral and basic component of real Rule of Law Democracy and Universal Suffrage has clear moral advantages compared with census limited participation. Our analysis shows the moral foundation of Universal Suffrage is even less solid than economic. Undeserved privilege is encouraging more and more people to drop their responsibilities for themselves and for their families, while securing their “right” to decide the country’s fate on the Day of Elections. New irresponsible and budget dependent voters create new opportunities for the bureaucrats seeking discretion power and additional funding for theirs bureaus. We stress reasonable doubt about Long Run compatibility of Universal Suffrage with constitutional foundations of Democracy (like property rights, free speech and more). Supporters of the Welfare state require that their power to rig elections be secured for the sake of fighting Discrimination. The same people often require that votes of their opponents be ignored (i. e. effectively denying opponents’ “right to vote”). As a result, one could observe now pretty broad consensus on the necessity to introduce (to restore) qualifications for voting.

Suggested Citation

  • Yanovskiy, Konstantin E. (Яновский, Константин) & Zhavoronkov, Sergei V. (Жаворонков, Сергей), 2017. "The Few Notes on Universal Suffrage Morality [Несколько Заметок О Моральности Всеобщей Избирательной Привилегии]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 102-123, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1764
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Universal Suffrage; conflict of interest; bad incentives’ reproduction.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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