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Credibility and endogenous societal discounting

Author

Listed:
  • Christopher Sleet

    (Carnegie Mellon University)

  • Sevin Yeltekin

    (Northwestern University)

Abstract

We consider a dynamic moral hazard economy inhabited by a planner and a population of privately informed agents. We assume that the planner and the agents share the same discount factor, but that the planner cannot commit. We show that optimal allocations in such settings solve the problems of committed planners who discount the future less heavily than agents. Thus, we provide micro-foundations for dynamic moral hazard models that assume a societal discount factor in excess of the private one. We extend the analysis to allocations that are reconsideration-proof in the sense of Kocherlakota (1996). We show that these allocations solve the choice problem of a committed planner with a unit discount factor. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Sleet & Sevin Yeltekin, 2006. "Credibility and endogenous societal discounting," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 9(3), pages 410-437, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:05-139
    DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2006.03.001
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    3. Kohei Kubota & Akiko Kamesaka & Masao Ogaki & Fumio Ohtake, 2013. "Cultures, Worldviews, and Intergenerational Altruism," ERSA conference papers ersa13p758, European Regional Science Association.
    4. Garriga, Carlos & Sánchez-Losada, Fernando, 2009. "Indirect taxation and the welfare effects of altruism on the optimal fiscal policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1365-1374, November.
    5. Brendon, Charles & Ellison, Martin, 2018. "Time-consistently undominated policies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87176, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Mele, Antonio, 2014. "Repeated moral hazard and recursive Lagrangeans," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 69-85.
    7. Alexander Karaivanov & Fernando Martin, 2015. "Dynamic Optimal Insurance and Lack of Commitment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 18(2), pages 287-305, April.
    8. Mikhail Golosov & Luigi Iovino, 2021. "Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(9), pages 2629-2665.
    9. Acemoglu, Daron & Golosov, Mikhail & Tsyvinski, Aleh, 2011. "Political economy of Ramsey taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7-8), pages 467-475, August.
    10. Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2017. "Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 23919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Mrs. Irina Yakadina & Mr. Michael Kumhof, 2007. "Politically Optimal Fiscal Policy," IMF Working Papers 2007/068, International Monetary Fund.
    12. Barrage, Lint, 2018. "Be careful what you calibrate for: Social discounting in general equilibrium," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 33-49.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credibility; Commitment; Dynamic private information; Social insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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