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Privatisation et dévolution des pouvoirs : le modèle français du gouvernement d'entreprise

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  • François Morin

Abstract

[fre] Le propos de cet article est de caractériser le modèle français du corporate governance à la fois sur un plan théorique, mais aussi sur un plan très pratique. Du point de vue conceptuel, on montre qu'il est possible de ranger le modèle français plutôt dans une approche théorique non standard que standard. En France, la gouvernance d'entreprise est en effet très liée à une organisation particulière des droits de propriété : la propriété circulaire. Dans une seconde partie, on mon­tre comment ce modèle atypique a trouvé son point d'application dans les derniè­res privatisations; la conséquence principale de ce choix pour l'économie française a été une profonde réorganisation de son cœur financier. [eng] This paper aims at identifying the french model of corporate governance, on a théorie level as well as on an empiric level. First, we will demonstrate that we should rank the french model among «non standard» theories rather than « standard theories ». Indeed, in France, corporate governance is related to parti­cular organization of the property rights : la propriété circulaire (circular property). In the second part, we explain how this specific model has been used at the time of the last privatisations. The way, the financial core has been reorganized is the main consequence of that choice for the french economy.

Suggested Citation

  • François Morin, 1996. "Privatisation et dévolution des pouvoirs : le modèle français du gouvernement d'entreprise," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(6), pages 1253-1268.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1996_num_47_6_409849
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1996.409849
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1996.409849
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1988. "One share-one vote and the market for corporate control," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 175-202, January.
    2. François Morin, 1994. "Liaisons financières et coopération des acteurs-systèmes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(6), pages 1459-1470.
    3. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    4. Patricia Charléty, 1994. "Les développements récents de la littérature," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 31(4), pages 33-48.
    5. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1991. "Economic Perspectives on Privatization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 111-132, Spring.
    6. Gérard Charreaux, 1994. "Conseil d'administration et pouvoirs dans l'entreprise," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 31(4), pages 49-79.
    7. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
    8. Herbert A. Simon, 1991. "Organizations and Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 25-44, Spring.
    9. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate control contests and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 55-86, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ulrike Mayrhoffer & Fabrice Roth, 1999. "Gestion de l'incertitude et influence de la diversification et de la nationalité sur les formes de rapprochement : une comparaison Allemagne, France et Royaume-Uni," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 2(4), pages 135-156, December.
    2. Cedric Yao & Gohlou Laetitia Diomandé, 2021. "Implementing A Research Framework Adapted To Corporate Governance [Mise En Place D’Un Cadre De Recherche Adapter A La Gouvernance D’Entreprise]," Post-Print hal-03315800, HAL.
    3. Fabrice Roth, 2000. "Gouvernement des entreprises et stratégie du dirigeant:une étude clinique dans le secteur de l'assurance," Working Papers CREGO 1000701, Université de Bourgogne - CREGO EA7317 Centre de recherches en gestion des organisations.
    4. Fabrice Roth, 2000. "Gouvernement des entreprises et stratégie du dirigeant:une étude clinique dans le secteur de l'assurance," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 3(4), pages 179-199, December.
    5. Semedo, Gervasio, 2007. "L’évolution des dépenses publiques en France : loi de Wagner, cycle électoral et contrainte européenne de subsidiarité," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 83(2), pages 123-162, juin.
    6. Andrea Goldstein, 1996. "Privatisations et contrôle des entreprises en France," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 47(6), pages 1309-1332.
    7. Hervé Alexandre & Mathieu Paquerot, 2000. "Efficacité des structures de contrôle et enracinement des dirigeants," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 3(2), pages 5-29, June.
    8. Cedric Yao & Gohlou Laetitia Diomandé, 2021. "Implementing A Research Framework Adapted To Corporate Governance [Mise En Place D’Un Cadre De Recherche Adapter A La Gouvernance D’Entreprise]," Working Papers hal-03315800, HAL.

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