Les déterminants de l’ampleur des bénéfices privés:un test sur données françaises
(VF)Notre objectif est d’étudier le lien entre le mode de contrôle d’une société cotée et les bénéfices privés sur le marché français, en définissant des canaux d’extraction de richesse, en mesurant ces derniers et en déterminant les principaux bénéficiaires. L’une des spécificités de notre approche est de proposer une mesure des bénéfices privés au travers des conventions réglementées. (VA) Our objective is to study the link between corporate control and private benefits in the French market. We do so by detecting methods of ex-tracting private benefits, measuring the latter’s importance and determin-ing the principal recipients. As one specificity of our approach we pro-pose a measure of private benefits by related party transactions.
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