IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this article

Governance Of Large Corporations In Mexico And Productivity Implications



    (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de las Américas-Puebla, México.)


The main objective of this paper is to describe the essential features of large Mexican firms. The observed structure fits with the stylized facts of the business groups found in many developing countries. In particular, there is a high concentration of control rights, not only because of the fact that family members own large holdings of stock in these firms, but also because it is a common practice to use pyramids and to issue “non-voting” shares. It is argued that the lack of counterbalances and the excessive control rights in the hands of few large shareholders produce a rent extraction problem. Hence those stakeholders that potentially experience opportunistic behavior are reluctant to establish long-term relationships, with the corresponding negative consequences on the productivity of the firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Gonzalo Castañeda Ramos, 2000. "Governance Of Large Corporations In Mexico And Productivity Implications," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 3(1), pages 57-89.
  • Handle: RePEc:pch:abante:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:57-89

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. La Porta, Rafael, et al, 1997. "Trust in Large Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 333-338, May.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    3. Kali, Raja, 1999. "Endogenous Business Networks," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 615-636, October.
    4. repec:hrv:faseco:30726298 is not listed on IDEAS
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Juan Manuel San Martin-Reyna & Jorge A. Duran-Encalada, 2015. "Effects of Family Ownership, Debt and Board Composition on Mexican Firms Performance," International Journal of Financial Studies, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 3(1), pages 1-19, March.
    2. Fernando Lefort & Eduardo Walker, 2000. "Corporate Governance: Challenges For Latin America," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 2(2), pages 99-111.

    More about this item


    Corporate Governance; Mexico; Related Credit;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pch:abante:v:3:y:2000:i:1:p:57-89. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gimena Pardo). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.