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Information Sharing and Rating Manipulation

Author

Listed:
  • Mariassunta Giannetti
  • José María Liberti
  • Jason Sturgess

Abstract

We show that banks manipulate borrowers’ credit ratings before sharing them with competing banks. Using a unique feature on the timing of information disclosure of a public credit registry, we disentangle the effect of manipulation from learning of credit ratings. We show that banks downgrade high-quality borrowers for which they have positive private information to protect their informational rents. Banks also upgrade low-quality borrowers with multiple lenders to avoid creditor runs. Our results suggest that credit ratings manipulation limits the positive effects of credit registries’ information disclosure on credit allocation.Received April 18, 2016; editorial decision April 1, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariassunta Giannetti & José María Liberti & Jason Sturgess, 2017. "Information Sharing and Rating Manipulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(9), pages 3269-3304.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:30:y:2017:i:9:p:3269-3304.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhx050
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    Cited by:

    1. Kalyvas, Antonios Nikolaos & Mamatzakis, Emmanuel, 2017. "Do creditor rights and information sharing affect the performance of foreign banks?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 13-35.
    2. Samuel Fosu & Albert Danso & Henry Agyei-Boapeah & Collins G. Ntim & Emmanuel Adegbite, 2020. "Credit information sharing and loan default in developing countries: the moderating effect of banking market concentration and national governance quality," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 55(1), pages 55-103, July.
    3. José Liberti & Jason Sturgess & Andrew Sutherland, 2018. "Economics of Voluntary Information Sharing," Working Papers 869, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    4. Olivier Darmouni & Andrew Sutherland, 2021. "Learning about Competitors: Evidence from SME Lending [Monthly payment targeting and the demand for maturity]," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 34(5), pages 2275-2317.
    5. Nurali Khan, 2022. "Credit Information Sharing and Firm Innovation: An Empirical Evidence," International Journal of Business and Management (IJBM), International Emerging Scholars Society (IESS), New Zealand, vol. 1(1), pages 87-96, July.
    6. Thanassoulis, John, 2018. "The I.O. of ethics and cheating when consumers do not have rational expectations," CEPR Discussion Papers 13172, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Liberti, José & Sturgess, Jason & Sutherland, Andrew, 2022. "How voluntary information sharing systems form: Evidence from a U.S. commercial credit bureau," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 827-849.
    8. repec:cwd:ijbmnz:v:1:y:2022:i:1:p:109-118 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. José María Liberti & Mitchell A. Petersen, 2018. "Information: Hard and Soft," NBER Working Papers 25075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Sha, Yezhou, 2022. "Rating manipulation and creditworthiness for platform economy: Evidence from peer-to-peer lending," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    11. Jinyang Li & Jenny Jing Wang & Minggui Yu, 2023. "Government provided rating, alleviation of financial constraints, and corporate investment," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 63(4), pages 3763-3779, December.
    12. Yunzhi Hu & Felipe Varas, 2021. "A Theory of Zombie Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1813-1867, August.
    13. Beck, Thorsten & Behr, Patrick & de Freitas Oliveira, Raquel, 2023. "Information Sharing, Access to Finance, Loan Contract Design, and the Labor Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 18131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Notheisen, Benedikt & Weinhardt, Christof, 2019. "The blockchain, plums, and lemons: Information asymmetries & transparency in decentralized markets," Working Paper Series in Economics 130, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    15. Snježana Deno & Thomas Loy & Carsten Homburg, 2020. "What Happens If Private Accounting Information Becomes Public? Small Firms’ Access to Bank Debt," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 44(6), pages 1091-1111, November.
    16. Theodora Bermpei & Antonios Nikolaos Kalyvas & Lorenzo Neri & Antonella Russo, 2019. "Will Strangers Help you Enter? The Effect of Foreign Bank Presence on New Firm Entry," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 56(1), pages 1-38, August.
    17. José María Liberti & Mitchell A Petersen, 2019. "Information: Hard and Soft," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(1), pages 1-41.
    18. Sutherland, Andrew, 2018. "Does credit reporting lead to a decline in relationship lending? Evidence from information sharing technology," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 123-141.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G02 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Finance: Underlying Principles
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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