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Statistical Default Models and Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Uday Rajan
  • Amit Seru
  • Vikrant Vig

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Uday Rajan & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Statistical Default Models and Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(2), pages 506-510, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:100:y:2010:i:2:p:506-10
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.2.506
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gorton, Gary B. & Pennacchi, George G., 1995. "Banks and loan sales Marketing nonmarketable assets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 389-411, June.
    2. Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1891-1921, October.
    3. Patrick Bolton & Xavier Freixas, 2000. "Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 324-351, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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