IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpg/wpaper/2009_33.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Credit Risk Transfer and Bank Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Hendrik Hakenes

    () (Institute of Financial Economics, Leibniz University of Hannover)

  • Isabel Schnabel

    () (Department of Law and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz)

Abstract

We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’ access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is private information, banks have an incentive to grant unprofitable loans in order to transfer them to other parties, leading to an increase in aggregate risk. Nevertheless, the introduction of CRT generally increases welfare in our setup. However, under private information, higher competition induces an expansion of loans to unprofitable firms, which in the limit offsets the welfare gains from CRT completely.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrik Hakenes & Isabel Schnabel, 2009. "Credit Risk Transfer and Bank Competition," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_33, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_33
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2009_33online.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pennacchi, George G, 1988. " Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(2), pages 375-396, June.
    2. Keys, Benjamin J. & Mukherjee, Tanmoy & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2009. "Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 700-720, July.
    3. Chiesa, Gabriella, 2008. "Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored finance, and banks," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 464-477, October.
    4. Wagner, Wolf & Marsh, Ian W., 2006. "Credit risk transfer and financial sector stability," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, pages 173-193.
    5. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008. "Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262062704, January.
    6. Hans Degryse & Steven Ongena, 2005. "Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(1), pages 231-266, February.
    7. Gorton, Gary B. & Pennacchi, George G., 1995. "Banks and loan sales Marketing nonmarketable assets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, pages 389-411.
    8. Ashcraft, Adam B. & Santos, João A.C., 2009. "Has the CDS market lowered the cost of corporate debt?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 514-523, May.
    9. Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44, pages 367-384, March.
    10. Christine A. Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1291-1314, June.
    11. Jeremy C. Stein, 2002. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized versus Hierarchical Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1891-1921, October.
    12. Alan Morrison, 2000. "Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation and Investment Decisions," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe01, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
    13. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
    14. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
    15. Alan D. Morrison, 2005. "Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation, and Investment Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 621-648, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Iñaki Aldasoro & Andreas Barth, 2017. "Syndicated loans and CDS positioning," ESRB Working Paper Series 58, European Systemic Risk Board.
    2. Ahn, Jung-Hyun & Breton, Régis, 2014. "Securitization, competition and monitoring," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 195-210.
    3. Augustin, Patrick & Subrahmanyam, Marti G. & Tang, Dragon Yongjun & Wang, Sarah Qian, 2014. "Credit Default Swaps: A Survey," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 9(1-2), pages 1-196, December.
    4. Li, Zhe & Sun, Jianfei, 2011. "Bank competition, securitization and risky investment," MPRA Paper 34173, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Silva Buston, C.F., 2013. "Active Risk Management and Banking Stability," Discussion Paper 2013-068, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Silva Buston, Consuelo, 2016. "Active risk management and banking stability," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(S), pages 203-215.
    7. Chen, Zhizhen & Liu, Frank Hong & Opong, Kwaku & Zhou, Mingming, 2017. "Short-term safety or long-term failure? Empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 48-74.
    8. Kevin x.d. Huang & Zhe Li & Jianfei Sun, 2018. "Bank Competition, Directed Search, and Loan Sales," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 18-00001, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    9. Constantin ANGHELACHE & Alexandru MANOLE & Mădălina Gabriela ANGHEL & Diana Valentina SOARE, 2016. "Statistical-econometric model used to analyze the operational and insolvency risks," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, vol. 0(3(608), A), pages 221-228, Autumn.
    10. Fiordelisi, Franco & Mare, Davide Salvatore, 2014. "Competition and financial stability in European cooperative banks," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-16.
    11. Constantin ANGHELACHE & Alexandru MANOLE & Mădălina Gabriela ANGHEL & Diana Valentina SOARE, 2016. "Statistical-econometric model used to analyze the operational and insolvency risks," Theoretical and Applied Economics, Asociatia Generala a Economistilor din Romania - AGER, pages 221-228.
    12. Farruggio, Christian & Uhde, André, 2015. "Determinants of loan securitization in European banking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 12-27.
    13. Correia, Ricardo & Dubiel-Teleszynski, Tomasz Piotr & Población García, Francisco Javier, 2017. "A structural model to study the bail-out process in a bank and its macro-prudential policy implications," Working Paper Series 2110, European Central Bank.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    access to credit; bank competition; credit derivatives; Credit risk transfer; public and private information;

    JEL classification:

    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_33. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marc Martin). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/mppggde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.