Why Did Sponsor Banks Rescue Their SIVs? A Signaling Model of Rescues
[Securitization without risk transfer]
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More about this item
Keywords
Reputation risk; Rescues; Mispricing; Implicit support; Shadow banking system;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
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