Monetary policy communication and uncertainty
Central banks have become progressively more transparent in explaining to the public the rationale for a given monetary policy decision, often using economic projections as a vehicle for explaining policy issues. Nevertheless, increased transparency poses potential risks, particularly if the uncertainty around projected outcomes is not communicated in a way that avoids misleading readers. This article describes a number of the options available to central banks for communicating uncertainty.
Volume (Year): 66 (2003)
Issue (Month): (June)
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- Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002.
"Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts,"
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 99-118.
- Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2001. "Does it pay to be transparent? International evidence from central bank forecasts," Bank of England working papers 143, Bank of England.
- Mervyn King, 1994. "Monetary policy in the UK," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 15(3), pages 109-128, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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