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Monetary policy communication and uncertainty

  • Tim Hampton
  • Dominick Stephens
  • Renee Philip

    (Reserve Bank of New Zealand)

Registered author(s):

    Central banks have become progressively more transparent in explaining to the public the rationale for a given monetary policy decision, often using economic projections as a vehicle for explaining policy issues. Nevertheless, increased transparency poses potential risks, particularly if the uncertainty around projected outcomes is not communicated in a way that avoids misleading readers. This article describes a number of the options available to central banks for communicating uncertainty.

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    File URL: http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research_and_publications/reserve_bank_bulletin/2003/2003jun66_2hamptonphilipstephens.pdf
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    Article provided by Reserve Bank of New Zealand in its journal Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin.

    Volume (Year): 66 (2003)
    Issue (Month): (June)
    Pages:

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    Handle: RePEc:nzb:nzbbul:june2003:3
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    1. Mervyn King, 1994. "Monetary policy in the UK," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 15(3), pages 109-28, August.
    2. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 99-118.
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