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Political paradoxes of economic sanctions

Author

Listed:
  • Afontsev, S.

    (Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

The article addresses political economy aspects of the policy of economic sanctions. Given the fact that decisions taken both in sender and target countries depend on the interaction of numerous groups of political and economic agents, sanction research can be productive only if their behavior is explicitly modelled given their objective functions and institutional context they face. It is shown that political economy approach can help resolve a number of paradoxes common in sanction research, i. e., paradoxes related to ineffi ciency of sanctions, pro-conflict reaction on sanctions by target countries, escalation of ineffi cient sanctions by sender countries, and retaliatory measures. Analysis shows that escalation of economic sanctions against the Russian Federation can not shift country's foreign policy in the direction preferred by sender countries. On the contrary, higher sanction costs for the Russian economy fuel domestic political support for current foreign policy decisions. Consequently, confl ict resolution should rely upon multilateral political dialogue rather than economic sanctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Afontsev, S., 2022. "Political paradoxes of economic sanctions," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 55(3), pages 193-198.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2022:i:55:p:193-198
    DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2022-55-3-10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pablo Fajgelbaum & Pinelopi Goldberg & Patrick Kennedy & Amit Khandelwal & Daria Taglioni, 2024. "The US-China Trade War and Global Reallocations," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 295-312, June.
    2. Kaempfer, William H. & Lowenberg, Anton D., 2007. "The Political Economy of Economic Sanctions," Handbook of Defense Economics, in: Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler (ed.), Handbook of Defense Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 27, pages 867-911, Elsevier.
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    Cited by:

    1. E. B. Lenchuk, 2023. "Technological Modernization as a Basis for the Anti-Sanctions Policy," Studies on Russian Economic Development, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 464-472, August.
    2. Izotov, Dmitriy (Изотов, Дмитрий), 2023. "Russia and China: current problems of trade interactions and the long-term prospects for economic cooperation [Россия И Китай: Текущие Проблемы Торговых Взаимодействий И Долгосрочные Перспективы Сближения Экономик]," Power and administration in the east of Russia, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, issue 3, pages 70-87.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights

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