Factors that Determines the Success of Business Demon Value Added Management
The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive indication of the Business Demon Value Added Management (BDVAM) as a form of Politics Governance Responsibility (PGR). This paper is to achieve its objectives by reviewing some relevant literature related to the five main areas of Business Demon Value Added Management (BDVAM) i.e revenue management, cost management, resource management, capital investment management, and sustainability. Through the above critical review of the existing literature, this paper on feature five factors that should be met as a condition for the successful practice of BDVAM, namely:(1) the amount of the commitment of business demon as a minority shareholder to suppress the majority shareholder of the company to solve operational problems, financial, political, social and environment with the help of the media, (2) the strength of militarist paradigm adopted by the business demon, (3) the ability of business demon to do coopetition, which is able to provide added value for shareholders and stakeholders, (4) the ability of business demon meet its working capital with an unlimited source of funds, (5) the ability of business demon builds mutual benefits with government bureaucrats and suppliers. From the previous paper discussed more success in the role of business angel in providing added value for the company. This paper focuses on the business demon by introducing five prepositions that can improve the performance of the company. This literature is limited only to answer five fundamental questions: (1) why the business demon success or failure in applying BDVAM? (2) what are the internal and external factors that are needed to qualify at the time of applying BDVAM, (3) how to improve and discrepancies in stock prices, while the growing political rents, interest in working at the company worker¡¯s is reduced because of the inability of the business demon? (4) the opinion of the author, which one is better between business demon and business angel in adding value? (5) how to improve the model BDVAM that this model does not become BDVDM (Business Demon Value Destruction Management), where business demon has dominant rols in setting the company¡¯s stock price. The previous paper discussed more on the role of business angel in providing value added and nothing that specifically addresses the business demon who has political connections with government. The first contribution of this paper to the existing literature can be found that the relationship BDVAM with operational performance, financial, political,social and environment is still not widely studied. Second, this paper adds to the literature on entrepreneurial finance in particular how BDVAM could be an alternative strategy for the business demon in the plan will be to invest in the company. Also in this paper introduces Business Demon Value Destruction Management (BDVDM), which is a management concept that states that the business demon success is providing value to the business angel and other shareholder to buy an existing company or merged with other similar companies, as well as influencing stakdeholders to close the company if there is a discrepancy in a process that could harm customers in the long term.
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