IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mth/ber888/v4y2014i1p319-350.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Factors that Determines the Success of Business Demon Value Added Management

Author

Listed:
  • Albert Irawan

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive indication of the Business Demon Value Added Management (BDVAM) as a form of Politics Governance Responsibility (PGR). This paper is to achieve its objectives by reviewing some relevant literature related to the five main areas of Business Demon Value Added Management (BDVAM) i.e revenue management, cost management, resource management, capital investment management, and sustainability. Through the above critical review of the existing literature, this paper on feature five factors that should be met as a condition for the successful practice of BDVAM, namely:(1) the amount of the commitment of business demon as a minority shareholder to suppress the majority shareholder of the company to solve operational problems, financial, political, social and environment with the help of the media, (2) the strength of militarist paradigm adopted by the business demon, (3) the ability of business demon to do coopetition, which is able to provide added value for shareholders and stakeholders, (4) the ability of business demon meet its working capital with an unlimited source of funds, (5) the ability of business demon builds mutual benefits with government bureaucrats and suppliers. From the previous paper discussed more success in the role of business angel in providing added value for the company. This paper focuses on the business demon by introducing five prepositions that can improve the performance of the company. This literature is limited only to answer five fundamental questions: (1) why the business demon success or failure in applying BDVAM? (2) what are the internal and external factors that are needed to qualify at the time of applying BDVAM, (3) how to improve and discrepancies in stock prices, while the growing political rents, interest in working at the company worker's is reduced because of the inability of the business demon? (4) the opinion of the author, which one is better between business demon and business angel in adding value? (5) how to improve the model BDVAM that this model does not become BDVDM (Business Demon Value Destruction Management), where business demon has dominant rols in setting the company's stock price. The previous paper discussed more on the role of business angel in providing value added and nothing that specifically addresses the business demon who has political connections with government. The first contribution of this paper to the existing literature can be found that the relationship BDVAM with operational performance, financial, political,social and environment is still not widely studied. Second, this paper adds to the literature on entrepreneurial finance in particular how BDVAM could be an alternative strategy for the business demon in the plan will be to invest in the company. Also in this paper introduces Business Demon Value Destruction Management (BDVDM), which is a management concept that states that the business demon success is providing value to the business angel and other shareholder to buy an existing company or merged with other similar companies, as well as influencing stakdeholders to close the company if there is a discrepancy in a process that could harm customers in the long term.

Suggested Citation

  • Albert Irawan, 2014. "Factors that Determines the Success of Business Demon Value Added Management," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 4(1), pages 319-350, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:mth:ber888:v:4:y:2014:i:1:p:319-350
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber/article/view/5325/4581
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber/article/view/5325
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Aram, John D., 1989. "Attitudes and behaviors of informal investors toward early-stage investments, technology-based ventures, and coinvestors," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 4(5), pages 333-347, September.
    2. Agnes Cheng, C.S. & He Huang, Henry & Li, Yinghua & Lobo, Gerald, 2010. "Institutional monitoring through shareholder litigation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 356-383, March.
    3. Art Durnev & Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, 2004. "Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 65-105, February.
    4. Anil K. Gupta & Vijay Govindarajan, 2000. "Knowledge flows within multinational corporations," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 473-496, April.
    5. Johannes Münster & Klaas Staal, 2012. "How organizational structure can reduce rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 579-594, March.
    6. Alon Brav & Wei Jiang & Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, 2008. "Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(4), pages 1729-1775, August.
    7. Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz, 1963. "A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number frie63-1, March.
    8. Richard T. Harrison & Mark R. Dibben & Colin M. Mason, 1997. "The Role of Trust in the Informal Investor's Investment Decision: An Exploratory Analysis," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 21(4), pages 63-81, July.
    9. Guercio, Diane Del & Hawkins, Jennifer, 1999. "The motivation and impact of pension fund activism," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 293-340, June.
    10. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss & Xose H. Vazquez-Vicente, 2003. ""Tying the Manager's Hands": How Firms can make Credible Commitments that make Opportunistic Managerial Intervention Less Likely," DRUID Working Papers 03-10, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
    11. Hutton, Amy P. & Marcus, Alan J. & Tehranian, Hassan, 2009. "Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 67-86, October.
    12. Jean-Sebastien Lantz & Sophie Montandrau & Jean-Michel Sahut, 2014. "Activism of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Alerts and Financial Performance," Working Papers 2014-353, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    13. Del Guercio, Diane & Seery, Laura & Woidtke, Tracie, 2008. "Do boards pay attention when institutional investor activists "just vote no"?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-103, October.
    14. Yasuhisa Tashiro, 1999. "Business angels in Japan," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 1(3), pages 259-273, July.
    15. Lee, Dong Wook & Park, Kyung Suh, 2009. "Does institutional activism increase shareholder wealth? Evidence from spillovers on non-target companies," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 488-504, September.
    16. Casey Ichniowski & Kathryn Shaw, 1999. "The Effects of Human Resource Management Systems on Economic Performance: An International Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Plants," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(5), pages 704-721, May.
    17. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 1989. "Proxy contests and the governance of publicly held corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 29-59, June.
    18. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    19. Sudipto Bhattacharya, 1979. "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and "The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 259-270, Spring.
    20. Greenwood, Robin & Schor, Michael, 2009. "Investor activism and takeovers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 362-375, June.
    21. Shaio-Yan Huang & Yu-Chung Hung & Chi-Chen Lin & Ing-Jung Tang, 2009. "The effects of innovative capacity and capital expenditures on financial performance," International Journal of Innovation and Learning, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 6(3), pages 323-341.
    22. Kim, Woochan & Kim, Woojin & Kwon, Kap-Sok, 2009. "Value of outside blockholder activism: Evidence from the switchers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 505-522, September.
    23. Ertimur, Yonca & Ferri, Fabrizio & Stubben, Stephen R., 2010. "Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder proposals," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 53-72, February.
    24. Gordon, Lilli A & Pound, John, 1993. "Information, Ownership Structure, and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance Proposals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(2), pages 697-718, June.
    25. Sullivan, Mary Kay & Miller, Alex, 1996. "Segmenting the informal venture capital market: Economic, hedonistic, and altruistic investors," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 25-35, May.
    26. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, 2009. "Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 187-229, February.
    27. Kaplanski, Guy & Levy, Haim, 2010. "Sentiment and stock prices: The case of aviation disasters," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 174-201, February.
    28. Kevin Hindle & Leo Lee, 2002. "An exploratory investigation of informal venture capitalists in Singapore," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(2), pages 169-177, April.
    29. Stuart Paul & Geoff Whittam & Jim B Johnston, 2003. "The operation of the informal venture capital market in Scotland," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(4), pages 313-335, August.
    30. Gul, Ferdinand A. & Kim, Jeong-Bon & Qiu, Annie A., 2010. "Ownership concentration, foreign shareholding, audit quality, and stock price synchronicity: Evidence from China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 425-442, March.
    31. Marco Becht & Julian Franks & Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, 2010. "Returns to Shareholder Activism: Evidence from a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund," NBER Chapters, in: Corporate Governance, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    32. Mohsin Habib & Leon Zurawicki, 2002. "Corruption and Foreign Direct Investment," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 33(2), pages 291-307, June.
    33. Roberta Romano, 2000. "Less Is More: Making Shareholder Activism A Valued Mechanism Of Corporate Governance," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm140, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Nov 2001.
    34. Pornanong Budsaratragoon & Suntharee Lhaopadchan & David Hillier, 2010. "Institutional Shareholder Activism and Limited Investor Attention," Review of Behavioral Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 2(2), pages 106-124, September.
    35. Miller, Merton H & Rock, Kevin, 1985. "Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1031-1051, September.
    36. Haar, Nancy E. & Starr, Jennifer & MacMillan, Ian C., 1988. "Informal risk capital investors: Investment patterns on the East Coast of the U.S.A," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 11-29.
    37. Peter Kelly & Michael Hay, 2000. "'Deal-makers': Reputation attracts quality," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(3), pages 183-202, July.
    38. Heinrich Stedler & Hans Peters, 2003. "Business angels in Germany: An empirical study," Venture Capital, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(3), pages 269-276.
    39. David J. Brophy & Joel M. Shulman, 1992. "A Finance Perspective on Entrepreneurship Research," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 16(3), pages 61-72, April.
    40. Paul C. Tetlock, 2007. "Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the Stock Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1139-1168, June.
    41. Jonathan D. Arthurs & Lowell W. Busenitz, 2003. "The Boundaries and Limitations of Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory in the Venture Capitalist/Entrepreneur Relationship," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 28(2), pages 145-162, March.
    42. Freear, John & Sohl, Jeffrey E. & Wetzel, William Jr., 1994. "Angels and non-angels: Are there differences?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 109-123, March.
    43. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    44. Roberta Romano, 2001. "Less is More: Making Shareholder Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance," CeRP Working Papers 12, Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies, Turin (Italy).
    45. Amy J. Hillman & Gerald D. Keim, 2001. "Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and social issues: what's the bottom line?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 125-139, February.
    46. Gombola, Michael J. & Liu, Feng-Ying, 1999. "The Signaling Power of Specially Designated Dividends," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(3), pages 409-424, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bajo, Emanuele & Barbi, Massimiliano & Bigelli, Marco & Hillier, David, 2013. "The role of institutional investors in public-to-private transactions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(11), pages 4327-4336.
    2. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Szilagyi, P.G., 2009. "Shareholder Activism through the Proxy Process," Other publications TiSEM cc25d736-2965-4511-b100-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Yeh, Tsung-ming, 2017. "Determinants and consequences of shareholder proposals: The cases of board election, charter amendment, and profit disposal," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 245-261.
    4. Renneboog, Luc & Szilagyi, Peter G., 2011. "The role of shareholder proposals in corporate governance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 167-188, February.
    5. Denes, Matthew R. & Karpoff, Jonathan M. & McWilliams, Victoria B., 2017. "Thirty years of shareholder activism: A survey of empirical research," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 405-424.
    6. Ertimur, Yonca & Ferri, Fabrizio & Stubben, Stephen R., 2010. "Board of directors' responsiveness to shareholders: Evidence from shareholder proposals," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 53-72, February.
    7. Thomas Smythe & Chris McNeil & Philip English, 2015. "When does CalPERS’ activism add value?," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 39(4), pages 641-660, October.
    8. Nicole Boyson & Robert Mooradian, 2011. "Corporate governance and hedge fund activism," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 169-204, July.
    9. Simon Rafaqat & Sana Rafaqat & Sahil Rafaqat & Saoul Rafaqat & Dawood Rafaqat, 2023. "Shareholder Activism and Firm Performance: A Review," Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, AMH International, vol. 14(4), pages 31-41.
    10. Edmans, Alex & Holderness, Clifford, 2016. "Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 11442, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Erenburg, Grigori & Smith, Janet Kiholm & Smith, Richard, 2016. "Which institutional investors matter for firm survival and performance?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 348-373.
    12. Harford, Jarrad & Kecskés, Ambrus & Mansi, Sattar, 2018. "Do long-term investors improve corporate decision making?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 424-452.
    13. Gine, Mireia & Moussawi, Rabih & Sedunov, John, 2017. "Governance mechanisms and effective activism: Evidence from shareholder proposals on poison pills," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 185-202.
    14. Raluca Roman, 2015. "Shareholder activism in banking," Research Working Paper RWP 15-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    15. Havranek, Tomas & Bajzík, Josef & Irsova, Zuzana & Novak, Jiri, 2023. "Does Shareholder Activism Create Value? A Meta-Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 18233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Szilagyi, P.G., 2007. "Corporate governance and the agency costs of debt and outside equity," Other publications TiSEM 9520d40a-224f-43a8-9bf9-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    17. Jean-Sebastien Lantz & Sophie Montandrau & Jean-Michel Sahut, 2014. "Activism of Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance Alerts and Financial Performance," Working Papers 2014-353, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    18. Kim, Woochan & Sung, Taeyoon & Wei, Shang-Jin, 2017. "The diffusion of corporate governance to emerging markets: Evaluating two dimensions of investor heterogeneity," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 406-432.
    19. Tang, Tingfeng, 2020. "Hedge fund activism and corporate innovation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 335-348.
    20. Khan, Zazy, 2015. "Activist Hedge Funds: Evidence from the Recent Financial Crisis," MPRA Paper 72025, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 27 May 2016.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Business Demon Value Added Management (BDVAM); Business Demon Value Destruction Management (BDVDM); Politic Responsibility; Entrepreneurial Finance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mth:ber888:v:4:y:2014:i:1:p:319-350. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Technical Support Office (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.