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Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model

Author

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  • Norbert Schulz
  • Francesco Parisi
  • Ben Depoorter

Abstract

This paper develops a general model of anticommons fragmentation in property. Using several related examples, we consider the equilibria obtained under different scenarios. The various illustrations are later utilized to develop a model of fragmented property. The model reveals that the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their individual decisions. Our model suggests that the results of underutilization of joint property increasemonotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation and (b) the forgone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. We explore some important implications for the institutional responses to issues of property fragmentation.

Suggested Citation

  • Norbert Schulz & Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, 2002. "Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 594-594, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200212)158:4_594:fiptag_2.0.tx_2-r
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Buchanan, James M & Yoon, Yong J, 2000. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-13, April.
    2. Eggertsson, Thrainn, 1990. "The role of transaction costs and property rights in economic analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 450-457, May.
    3. Jeffrey P. Carpenter, 2000. "Negotiation in the Commons: Incorporating Field and Experimental Evidence into a Theory of Local Collective Action," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(4), pages 661-661, December.
    4. Schulz, Norbert, 2000. "Thoughts on the nature of vetoes when bargaining on public projects," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 17, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.
    5. Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bessen James, 2009. "Evaluating the Economic Performance of Property Systems," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(3), pages 1037-1061, December.
    2. Paolo CROSETTO, 2010. "To patent or not to patent: a pilot experiment on incentives to copyright in a sequential innovation setting," Departmental Working Papers 2010-05, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    3. repec:ann:journl:v:20:y:2017:i:2:p:77-88 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Vinit Mukhija, 2005. "Collective Action and Property Rights: A Planner's Critical Look at the Dogma of Private Property," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 972-983, December.
    5. Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2011. "Toward an asymmetric Coase theorem," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 111-122, February.
    6. Francesco Parisi & Norbert Schulz & Ben Depoorter, 2004. "Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 175-190, March.
    7. José António Filipe & Manuel Alberto M. Ferreira & Manuel Coelho, 2007. "The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons: A New Problem. An Application to the Fisheries," Working Papers Department of Economics 2007/16, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
    8. Parisi, Francesco & Schulz, Norbert & Klick, Jonathan, 2006. "Two dimensions of regulatory competition," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 56-66, March.
    9. Premrl, Tine & Udovč, Andrej & Bogataj, Nevenka & Krč, Janez, 2015. "From restitution to revival: A case of commons re-establishment and restitution in Slovenia," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 19-26.
    10. Parente, Michael D. & Winn, Abel M., 2012. "Bargaining behavior and the tragedy of the anticommons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 475-490.
    11. Giuseppe Bellantuono, 2014. "The regulatory anticommons of green infrastructures," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 325-354, April.
    12. Ivan Major, 2014. "A Political Economy Application of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons”: The Greek Government Debt Crisis," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 20(4), pages 425-437, November.
    13. repec:kap:iaecre:v:20:y:2014:i:4:p:425-437 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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