Thoughts on the nature of vetoes when bargaining on public projects
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- Chen, Yan & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1993.
"Veto Games: Spatial Committees Under Unanimity Rule,"
847, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Chen, Yan & Ordeshook, Peter C, 1998. "Veto Games: Spatial Committees under Unanimity Rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(4), pages 617-643, December.
- Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1984. "Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(375), pages 580-598, September.
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