Simultaneous and Sequential Anticommons
This paper defines a framework for anticommons analysis based on the fragmentation of property rights. In differentiating between sequential and simultaneous cases of property fragmentation, we describe and assess the equilibria obtained under each scenario. Our model reveals how the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their decisions. Moreover, our model suggests that the result of underutilization of joint property increases monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we can therefore explore important implications for possible institutional responses to a range of issues raised by the concept of property fragmentation.
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- Buchanan, James M & Yoon, Yong J, 2000. "Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 43(1), pages 1-13, April.
- Eggertsson, Thrainn, 1990. "The role of transaction costs and property rights in economic analysis," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 450-457, May.
- Schulz, Norbert, 2000. "Thoughts on the nature of vetoes when bargaining on public projects," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 17, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.
- Norbert Schulz & Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, 2002.
"Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(4), pages 594-594, December.
- Schulz, Norbert & Parisi, Francesco & Depoorter, Ben, 2001. "Fragmentation in property: Towards a general model," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 32, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.
- Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908.
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