Fragmentation in property: Towards a general model
This paper develops a general model of anticommons fragmentation in property. To this end, we differentiate between different forms of property fragmentation. With the use of several functionally related examples, we consider the equilibria obtained under different scenarios. The various illustrations are later utilized as building blocks for the development of a general model of fragmented property. The model reveals that the private incentives of excluders do not capture the external effects of their individual decisions. Specifically, our model suggests that the results of underutilization of joint property increase monotonically in both (a) the extent of fragmentation; and (b) the foregone synergies and complementarities between the property fragments. Within this context, we explore some of the important implications for the institutional responses to issues of property fragmentation.
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (0931) 31-2901
Fax: (0931) 31-2101
Web page: http://www.vwl.uni-wuerzburg.de/en/no_cache/lehrstuehle/vwl1/home/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter, 2000. "Negotiation in the Commons: Incorporating Field and Experimental Evidence into a Theory of Local Collective Action," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 156(4), pages 661-, December.
- Schulz, Norbert, 2000. "Thoughts on the nature of vetoes when bargaining on public projects," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 17, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.
- Miceli, Thomas J., 1997. "Economics of the Law: Torts, Contracts, Property, Litigation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195103908, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wuewep:32. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.