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Becoming global billionaires from mainland China: 2004–2018

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  • Kezhou Xiao

    (Lingnan College, Sun Yat-Sen University)

Abstract

This paper documents the increase in the number of global billionaires from mainland China between 2004 and 2018. One of the key findings is that under conditions of an open economy, grassroots billionaire entrepreneurs (e.g., Jack Ma) could mitigate political economy as well as financial frictions via capital injections from foreign venture capitalists. By building a unique database, I report that (i) the politically unconnected billionaire entrepreneurs financed by foreign venture capitalists are more likely to go public their companies outside mainland China (mainly in Hong Kong and the USA), use offshore financing vehicles, and enter the innovation sector and (ii) the politically connected global billionaire entrepreneurs, however, are closely associated with a record of state-owned enterprise (SOE) restructuring. Plain English Summary The increase in the number of billionaire entrepreneurs (e.g., Jack Ma) from mainland China between 2004 and 2018 is a new phenomenon, which necessitates a reassessment of the crony capitalism arguments, the types of entrepreneurs, and the sources of innovation. This paper has important implications for future research on entrepreneurship in a global economy and the design of relevant policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Kezhou Xiao, 2024. "Becoming global billionaires from mainland China: 2004–2018," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 753-773, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:sbusec:v:62:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s11187-023-00782-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s11187-023-00782-2
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Global billionaires; China; Entrepreneurship;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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