Regulatory effects on the market penetration and capacity of reliability differentiated service
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-009-9094-3
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Keywords
; ; ; ; ; ; ;JEL classification:
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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