Patterns of Transmission Investment
This paper examines a number of issues associated with alternative analytical approaches for evaluating investments in electricity transmission infrastructure, and institutional arrangements to govern network operation, maintenance and investment. The relationships between transmission investments driven by opportunities to reduce congestion and loss costs and transmission investment driven by traditional engineering reliability criteria are discussed. Reliability rules play a much more important role in transmission investment decisions today than do economic investment criteria as depicted in standard economic models of transmission networks. These models fail to capture key aspects of transmission operating and investment behaviour that are heavily influenced by uncertainty, contingency criteria and associated engineering reliability rules. I illustrate how the wholesale market and transmission investment frameworks have addressed these issues in England and Wales (E&W) since 1990 and in the PJM Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) in the U.S. since 2000.
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- Joskow, Paul L., 2005.
"Transmission policy in the United States,"
Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 95-115, June.
- Paul L. Joskow, 2004. "Transmission Policy in the United States," Working Papers 0417, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.
- Joskow, P.L., 2004. "Transmission Policy in the United States," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0454, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Paul L. Joskow, 2006. "Incentive Regulation for Electricity Networks," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(2), pages 3-9, 07. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)