IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/juipol/v59y2019ic12.html

Electricity transmission cost allocation and network efficiency: Implications for Mexico's liberalized power market

Author

Listed:
  • Bushnell, James
  • Ibarra-Yúnez, Alejandro
  • Pappas, Nicholas

Abstract

In liberalized electricity markets, the coordination and funding of transmission infrastructure are ongoing challenges. The challenge is to establish transmission tariffs that provide signals for efficient usage of the existing network and demand for new network capacity. Mexico's liberalized electricity market exemplifies the changing responsibilities in transmission planning. Through the adoption of locational marginal pricing, the Mexican market is well positioned to capture congestion costs and motivate efficient behavior. We highlight some of the potential problems that Mexico's currently planned approach and transmission tariffs could raise for generation location incentives. A long-term transmission plan can facilitate network optimization, with generation following the lead of transmission investment instead of the other way around.

Suggested Citation

  • Bushnell, James & Ibarra-Yúnez, Alejandro & Pappas, Nicholas, 2019. "Electricity transmission cost allocation and network efficiency: Implications for Mexico's liberalized power market," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 1-1.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:59:y:2019:i:c:12
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2019.100932
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0957178718301085
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jup.2019.100932?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rosellón, Juan & Myslíková, Zdenka & Zenón, Eric, 2011. "Incentives for transmission investment in the PJM electricity market: FTRs or regulation (or both?)," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 3-13, January.
    2. Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 2005. "Merchant Transmission Investment," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 233-264, June.
    3. Thomas-Olivier Leautier, 2000. "Regulation of an Electric Power Transmission Company," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 61-92.
    4. Vogelsang, Ingo, 2001. "Price Regulation for Independent Transmission Companies," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 141-165, September.
    5. Schill, Wolf-Peter & Egerer, Jonas & Rosellón, Juan, 2015. "Testing Regulatory Regimes for Power Transmission Expansion with Fluctuating Demand and Wind Generation," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 47(1), pages 1-28.
    6. Pollitt, Michael, 2008. "The arguments for and against ownership unbundling of energy transmission networks," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 704-713, February.
    7. Joskow, Paul L., 2005. "Transmission policy in the United States," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 95-115, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gómez-Gardars, Emanuel Birkir & Rodríguez-Macias, Antonio & Tena-García, Jorge Luis & Fuentes-Cortés, Luis Fabián, 2022. "Assessment of the water–energy–carbon nexus in energy systems: A multi-objective approach," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 305(C).
    2. Castellanos-Sosa, Francisco A. & Cabral, René & Mollick, André Varella, 2022. "Energy reform and energy consumption convergence in Mexico: A spatial approach," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 336-350.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas-Olivier Léautier & Véronique Thelen, 2009. "Optimal expansion of the power transmission grid: why not?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 127-153, October.
    2. Jonas Egerer & Juan Rosellon & Wolf-Peter Schill, 2015. "Power System Transformation toward Renewables: An Evaluation of Regulatory Approaches for Network Expansion," The Energy Journal, , vol. 36(4), pages 105-128, October.
    3. Richard O’Neill & Emily Fisher & Benjamin Hobbs & Ross Baldick, 2008. "Towards a complete real-time electricity market design," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 220-250, December.
    4. Brunekreeft, Gert & Neuhoff, Karsten & Newbery, David, 2005. "Electricity transmission: An overview of the current debate," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 73-93, June.
    5. Ibarra-Yunez, Alejandro, 2015. "Energy reform in Mexico: Imperfect unbundling in the electricity sector," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 19-27.
    6. Stephen C. Littlechild & Carlos J. Skerk, 2004. "Regulation of transmission expansion in Argentina Part I: State ownership, reform and the Fourth Line," Working Papers EP61, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    7. Makoto TANAKA, 2005. "Optimal Transmission Capacity under Nodal Pricing and Incentive Regulation for Transco," Discussion papers 05021, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    8. Dagobert Brito & Juan Rosellón, 2011. "Lumpy Investment in Regulated Natural Gas Pipelines: An Application of the Theory of the Second Best," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 533-553, September.
    9. Matsukawa, Isamu, 2008. "The effects of average revenue regulation on electricity transmission investment and pricing," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 696-714, May.
    10. Rosellon, Juan, 2007. "An incentive mechanism for electricity transmission expansion in Mexico," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 3003-3014, May.
    11. Littlechild, Stephen C. & Skerk, Carlos J., 2008. "Transmission expansion in Argentina 2: The Fourth Line revisited," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1385-1419, July.
    12. Ingo Vogelsang, 2006. "Electricity Transmission Pricing and Performance-based Regulation," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 97-126.
    13. Bastian Henze & Charles Noussair & Bert Willems, 2012. "Regulation of network infrastructure investments: an experimental evaluation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 1-38, August.
    14. Juan Rosellón & Eric Zenón, 2010. "Expansión de las redes de transmisión eléctrica en Norteamérica: Teoría y aplicaciones," Working Papers DTE 479, CIDE, División de Economía.
    15. Wolf-Peter Schill & Jonas Egerer & Juan Rosellón, 2015. "Testing regulatory regimes for power transmission expansion with fluctuating demand and wind generation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 47(1), pages 1-28, February.
    16. Ruderer, Dominik & Zöttl, Gregor, 2018. "Transmission pricing and investment incentives," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 14-30.
    17. Wu, F.F & Zheng, F.L. & Wen, F.S., 2006. "Transmission investment and expansion planning in a restructured electricity market," Energy, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 954-966.
    18. Stephen Littlechild, 2012. "Merchant and regulated transmission: theory, evidence and policy," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 308-335, December.
    19. Zenón, Eric & Rosellón, Juan, 2017. "Optimal transmission planning under the Mexican new electricity market," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 349-360.
    20. Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh & Juan Rosellón & Steven A. Gabriel, 2015. "A Profit-Maximizing Approach for Transmission Expansion Planning Using a Revenue-Cap Incentive Mechanism," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1470, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L52 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:59:y:2019:i:c:12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/utilities-policy .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.