Land inequality and conflict intensity
This paper investigates the impact of land inequality on conflict intensity. A fundamental distinction with the existing literature lies in the nature of inequality under consideration. We investigate how land inequality across landlords only influences the intensity of the fight against a rebel group constituted by landless individuals. We show that conflict intensity is non-monotonic in land inequality. In particular, the most severe conflicts occur for intermediate land inequality levels. Moreover, a Pareto improving transfer of land from the smaller to the larger landlord may exist.
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Volume (Year): 150 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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