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Geographic Concentration of Institutional Blockholders and Workplace Safety Violations

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  • Xin Cheng

    (Renmin University of China)

  • Orhun Guldiken

    (Florida International University)

  • Wei Shi

    (University of Miami)

Abstract

This study uses insights from the political perspective on corporate governance to investigate the influence of geographic concentration of institutional blockholders on workplace safety violations. When institutional investors who have a blockholding stake (i.e., institutional blockholders) are geographically concentrated, corporate managers are more likely to pursue efficiency at the expense of employee interests because these blockholders may find it easier to coordinate their actions, strengthening their power over corporate managers and ultimately giving rise to more workplace safety violations. We also contend that the influence of institutional blockholders’ geographic concentration on workplace safety violations hinges upon the ownership of employees, socially responsible investment funds, and the CEO. Findings from a longitudinal sample of 1316 U.S. firms support our arguments. This study contributes to a nascent stream of research examining the influence of capital market participants on workplace safety by highlighting the role of institutional blockholders’ geographic concentration as a new channel through which investors can shape employee outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Xin Cheng & Orhun Guldiken & Wei Shi, 2023. "Geographic Concentration of Institutional Blockholders and Workplace Safety Violations," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 186(3), pages 593-613, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:186:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10551-022-05249-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-022-05249-0
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    1. Fernando, Guy D. & Schneible, Richard A. & Zhang, Wei, 2024. "Institutional ownership and women in the top management team," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 170(C).

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