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Collective versus segmentalist training system with a technology choice

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  • Naoki Shintoyo

    (Ryukoku University)

Abstract

This study develops a model to examine two training systems: collective, in which all firms choose a standard technology and contribute to and recruit from a common pool of workers with general skills; and segmentalist, in which all firms use their own technology and provide their employees with firm-specific training to secure skilled labor. This analysis demonstrates how a collective training system requires firms to collaborate well. This can occur only under certain conditions, which yields multiple equilibria, thus implying that a segmentalist training system can potentially occur when the collective training system takes place. This study compares the social welfare between equilibria and examines the possibility of welfare-improving reforms that transform a segmentalist training system into a collective one. The findings may have implications for recent trends in the Japanese training system.

Suggested Citation

  • Naoki Shintoyo, 2025. "Collective versus segmentalist training system with a technology choice," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 1-22, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:iecepo:v:22:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s10368-024-00644-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s10368-024-00644-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Firm-sponsored training; General skills; Firm-specific skills; Technology choice; Japanese economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M53 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Training
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
    • P52 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies

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