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(Un)fair Delegation: Exploring the Strategic Use of Equity Rules in International Climate Negotiations

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  • Andreas Lange

    (University of Hamburg)

  • Claudia Schwirplies

    (University of Hamburg)

Abstract

We provide a new approach for identifying a strategic use of equity arguments in international (climate) negotiations. We first develop a theoretical model of strategic delegation which accounts for both environmental as well as equity preferences. We show that the strategic use of equity arguments qualitatively depends on the extent to which environmental preferences can be misrepresented: representatives from different countries may be expected to have similar equity views rather than widely differing perceptions of a fair share. Based on survey data on climate negotiations, we then provide empirical evidence for differences between equity preferences of citizens from Germany, China, and the U.S. and the perceived view on the position of their respective countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Lange & Claudia Schwirplies, 2017. "(Un)fair Delegation: Exploring the Strategic Use of Equity Rules in International Climate Negotiations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 505-533, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:67:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s10640-017-0140-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-017-0140-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lange, Andreas & Löschel, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2010. "On the self-interested use of equity in international climate negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 359-375, April.
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    3. Hjerpe, Mattias & Löfgren, Åsa & Linnér, Björn-Ola & Hennlock, Magnus & Sterner, Thomas & Jagers, Sverker C., 2011. "Common ground for effort sharing? Preferred principles for distributing climate mitigation efforts," Working Papers in Economics 491, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
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    10. Kesternich, Martin & Löschel, Andreas & Ziegler, Andreas, 2014. "Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules among heterogeneous parties: Empirical evidence from a survey among delegates in international climate negotiations," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-031, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    11. Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, 2012. "Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(1), pages 67-87.
    12. Wolfgang Buchholz & Alexander Haupt & Wolfgang Peters, 2005. "International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(1), pages 175-195, March.
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    14. Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten & Ziegler, Andreas, 2007. "On the importance of equity in international climate policy: An empirical analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 545-562, May.
    15. Pauw, Pieter & Brandi, Clara & Richerzhagen, Carmen & Bauer, Steffen & Schmole, Hanna, 2014. "Different perspectives on differentiated responsibilities: a state-of-the-art review of the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities in international negotiations," IDOS Discussion Papers 6/2014, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
    16. Bård Harstad, 2008. "Do Side Payments Help? Collective Decisions and Strategic Delegation," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 468-477, 04-05.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arvaniti, Maria & Habla, Wolfgang, 2021. "The political economy of negotiating international carbon markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    2. Martin Kesternich & Andreas Löschel & Andreas Ziegler, 2021. "Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules in international climate negotiations: an empirical analysis," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 23(2), pages 309-331, April.
    3. Mark Schopf, 2024. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements and Altruistic Preferences," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 87(9), pages 2309-2359, September.
    4. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Peters, Wolfgang & Ufert, Aneta, 2018. "International environmental agreements on climate protection: A Binary choice model with heterogeneous agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 191-205.
    5. Martin Kesternich & Christiane Reif & Dirk Rübbelke, 2017. "Recent Trends in Behavioral Environmental Economics," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 403-411, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International environmental negotiations; Climate policy; Strategic delegation; Equity rules; Fairness principles;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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