IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/enreec/v67y2017i2d10.1007_s10640-015-9990-1.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Unilateral Climate Policy and Foreign Direct Investment with Firm and Country Heterogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • Francesca Sanna-Randaccio

    () (Sapienza University of Rome)

  • Roberta Sestini

    () (Sapienza University of Rome)

  • Ornella Tarola

    () (Sapienza University of Rome)

Abstract

Abstract We analyse the effects of unilateral climate policy in a two-country two-firm model, with endogenous plant location and heterogeneity in both country size and firm’s characteristics. The effectiveness of unilateral climate policy is shown to depend on the joint effect of country and firm heterogeneity, and on their impact on equilibrium location choice. For being effective and not leading to production relocation in the long-run, unilateral climate policy should be moderate, implemented by a sufficiently larger area and complemented by mechanisms promoting the international transfer of clean technologies. The model indicates that the smaller area cannot take the lead in global climate mitigation for a protracted time period. Finally, when the local community is not environmentally concerned, the unilateral policy unambiguously makes the society worse off.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesca Sanna-Randaccio & Roberta Sestini & Ornella Tarola, 2017. "Unilateral Climate Policy and Foreign Direct Investment with Firm and Country Heterogeneity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(2), pages 379-401, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:67:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-015-9990-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-015-9990-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10640-015-9990-1
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Abay Mulatu & Reyer Gerlagh & Dan Rigby & Ada Wossink, 2010. "Environmental Regulation and Industry Location in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(4), pages 459-479, April.
    2. Markusen James R. & Morey Edward R. & Olewiler Nancy D., 1993. "Environmental Policy when Market Structure and Plant Locations Are Endogenous," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 69-86, January.
    3. Edward Manderson & Richard Kneller, 2012. "Environmental Regulations, Outward FDI and Heterogeneous Firms: Are Countries Used as Pollution Havens?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(3), pages 317-352, March.
    4. Matthew A. Cole & Robert J. R. Elliott & Per G. Fredriksson, 2006. "Endogenous Pollution Havens: Does FDI Influence Environmental Regulations?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 157-178, March.
    5. Zeng, Dao-Zhi & Zhao, Laixun, 2009. "Pollution havens and industrial agglomeration," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 141-153, September.
    6. Sanna-Randaccio, Francesca & Sestini, Roberta, 2010. "The Impact of Unilateral Climate Policy with Endogenous Plant Location and Market Size Asymmetry," Sustainable Development Papers 94789, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    7. Rahel Aichele & Gabriel Felbermayr, 2013. "Estimating the Effects of Kyoto on Bilateral Trade Flows Using Matching Econometrics," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 303-330, March.
    8. Sajal Lahiri & George Symeonidis, 2007. "Piecemeal Multilateral Environmental Policy Reforms under Asymmetric Oligopoly," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 885-899, October.
    9. Motta, Massimo & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1994. "Does environmental dumping lead to delocation?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 563-576, April.
    10. Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Harrison, Ann E., 2003. "Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 1-23, February.
    11. Robert Elliott & Ying Zhou, 2013. "Environmental Regulation Induced Foreign Direct Investment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 55(1), pages 141-158, May.
    12. Ulrich Wagner & Christopher Timmins, 2009. "Agglomeration Effects in Foreign Direct Investment and the Pollution Haven Hypothesis," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 43(2), pages 231-256, June.
    13. Francesca Sanna-Randaccio & Roberta Sestini & Ornella Tarola, 2017. "Unilateral Climate Policy and Foreign Direct Investment with Firm and Country Heterogeneity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(2), pages 379-401, June.
    14. Michael Rauscher, 1995. "Environmental regulation and the location of polluting industries," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(2), pages 229-244, August.
    15. Francesca Sanna-Randaccio & Roberta Sestini, 2012. "The Impact of Unilateral Climate Policy with Endogenous Plant Location and Market Size Asymmetry," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 580-599, August.
    16. Bouwe R. Dijkstra & Anuj Joshua Mathew & Arijit Mukherjee, 2011. "Environmental Regulation: An Incentive for Foreign Direct Investment," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 568-578, August.
    17. Ki-Dong Lee & Woohyung Lee & Kichun Kang, 2014. "Pollution Haven with Technological Externalities Arising from Foreign Direct Investment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 57(1), pages 1-18, January.
    18. Abe, Kenzo & Zhao, Laixun, 2005. "Endogenous international joint ventures and the environment," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 221-240, September.
    19. Elhadj, Nada Ben & Tarola, Ornella, 2015. "Relative quality-related (dis)utility in a vertically differentiated oligopoly with an environmental externality," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(03), pages 354-379, June.
    20. Josh Ederington & Arik Levinson & Jenny Minier, 2005. "Footloose and Pollution-Free," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(1), pages 92-99, February.
    21. Masako Ikefuji & Jun-ichi Itaya & Makoto Okamura, 2009. "Optimal emission tax with endogenous location choice of duopolistic firms," ISER Discussion Paper 0762, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    22. Valentina Bosetti & Enrica De Cian, 2013. "A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 255-276, October.
    23. Ulph, Alistair & Valentini, Laura, 2001. " Is Environmental Dumping Greater When Plants Are Footloose?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(4), pages 673-688, December.
    24. Yuquing Xing & Charles Kolstad, 2002. "Do Lax Environmental Regulations Attract Foreign Investment?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 21(1), pages 1-22, January.
    25. Facundo Albornoz & Matthew A. Cole & Robert J. R. Elliott & Marco G. Ercolani, 2009. "In Search of Environmental Spillovers," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 136-163, January.
    26. Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, 1994. "North-South Trade and the Environment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 109(3), pages 755-787.
    27. Douglas, Stratford & Nishioka, Shuichiro, 2012. "International differences in emissions intensity and emissions content of global trade," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 415-427.
    28. Daniela Marconi & Francesca Sanna-Randaccio, 2012. "The clean development mechanism and technology transfer to China," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 129, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    29. Hoel, Michael, 1997. " Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(2), pages 241-259, June.
    30. Ulph, Alistair, 1996. "Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers Act Strategically," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 265-281, May.
    31. Eerola, Essi, 2006. "International trade agreements, environmental policy, and relocation of production," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 333-350, November.
    32. Hajime Sugeta & Shigeru Matsumoto, 2005. "Green Tax Reform in an Oligopolistic Industry," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(3), pages 253-274, July.
    33. Cole, Matthew A. & Fredriksson, Per G., 2009. "Institutionalized pollution havens," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(4), pages 1239-1256, February.
    34. M. Kayalica & Sajal Lahiri, 2005. "Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 30(1), pages 1-21, January.
    35. Golombek Rolf & Hoel Michael, 2004. "Unilateral Emission Reductions and Cross-Country Technology Spillovers," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(2), pages 1-27, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Francesca Sanna-Randaccio & Roberta Sestini & Ornella Tarola, 2017. "Unilateral Climate Policy and Foreign Direct Investment with Firm and Country Heterogeneity," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(2), pages 379-401, June.
    2. Julie Ing & Jean-Philippe Nicolai, 2019. "Dirty versus Clean Firms’ Relocation under International Trade and Imperfect Competition," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 19/319, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    3. G. Ceccantoni & O. Tarola & C. Vergari, 2017. "Relative tax in a vertically differentiated market: the key role of consumers in environment," Working Papers wp2005, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    4. Paolo GARELLA & Maria Teresa TRENTINAGLIA DE DAVERIO, 2015. "Carbon Tax, Emission Permits, and Carbon Leak under Price Competition," Departmental Working Papers 2015-06, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    5. repec:kap:enreec:v:72:y:2019:i:4:d:10.1007_s10640-018-0234-z is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Foreign direct investment; Carbon leakage; Climate policy; Plant location; Emissions technologies;

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:67:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-015-9990-1. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Mallaigh Nolan). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.