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The Political Game of European Fisheries Management

Author

Listed:
  • Margrethe Aanesen

    (The Arctic University of Norway-UiT)

  • Claire W. Armstrong

    (The Arctic University of Norway-UiT)

Abstract

European fisheries activities are subject to a hierarchy of regulatory authorities. This raises questions regarding the implications of strategic interaction between different authority levels concerning the regulation of these activities. We apply a bio-economic objective function where fishers and regulators have environmental, economic and social preferences, and where fishers are subject to the aggregate of the regulations set by the various authorities. We analyse one situation where EU authorities set their regulation first, followed by national authorities’ regulation, and one situation where the two regulators set their regulations simultaneously. Using data from a survey on preferences among fisheries stakeholders combined with data from the UK nephrops fisheries, this study shows that a hierarchy of regulators with similar preferences will yield higher unit regulations, i.e. higher taxes or higher subsidies than a situation with one regulating authority. When regulators have unequal preferences we may get a situation where one regulator induces a tax on effort, whereas the other offers a subsidy. In this situation the aggregate unit regulation becomes uncertain.

Suggested Citation

  • Margrethe Aanesen & Claire W. Armstrong, 2016. "The Political Game of European Fisheries Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 745-763, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:63:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s10640-015-9878-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-015-9878-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. World Bank & Food and Agriculture Organization, 2009. "The Sunken Billions : The Economic Justification for Fisheries Reform," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 2596, April.
    2. Campoy Juan Cristóbal & Negrete Juan C., 2010. "Structural Reforms and Budget Deficits in a Monetary Union: A Strategic Approach," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-31, July.
    3. Juan Campoy & Juan Negrete, 2008. "Optimal central banker contracts and common agency: a comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 197-206, October.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    5. Urs Steiner Brandt & Niels Vestergaard, 2006. "Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(4), pages 974-985.
    6. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2007. "Asymmetric information and uncertainty: The usefulness of logbooks as a regulation measure," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 815-827, September.
    7. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    8. Margrethe Aanesen & Claire Armstrong, 2013. "Stakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 320-338, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andries Richter & Anne Maria Eikeset & Daan Soest & Florian Klaus Diekert & Nils Chr. Stenseth, 2018. "Optimal Management Under Institutional Constraints: Determining a Total Allowable Catch for Different Fleet Segments in the Northeast Arctic Cod Fishery," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(4), pages 811-835, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    EU fisheries management; Management hierarchy; Multiple principals; Optimal regulations; Strategic interactions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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