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Asymmetric information and uncertainty: The usefulness of logbooks as a regulation measure

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  • Jensen, Frank
  • Vestergaard, Niels

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  • Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2007. "Asymmetric information and uncertainty: The usefulness of logbooks as a regulation measure," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 815-827, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:63:y:2007:i:4:p:815-827
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Weitzman, Martin L., 2002. "Landing Fees vs Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish Stocks," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 325-338, March.
    2. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1995. "Observability and choice of instrument mix in the control of externalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 485-498, March.
    3. Sethi, Gautam & Costello, Christopher & Fisher, Anthony & Hanemann, Michael & Karp, Larry, 2005. "Fishery management under multiple uncertainty," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 300-318, September.
    4. Urs Steiner Brandt & Niels Vestergaard, 2006. "Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(4), pages 974-985.
    5. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
    6. Reed, William J., 1979. "Optimal escapement levels in stochastic and deterministic harvesting models," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 350-363, December.
    7. Xepapadeas, A. P., 1991. "Environmental policy under imperfect information: Incentives and moral hazard," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 113-126, March.
    8. Ragnar Arnason, 1990. "Minimum Information Management in Fisheries," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(3), pages 630-653, August.
    9. Cabe, Richard & Herriges, Joseph A., 1992. "The Regulation of Non-Point Sources of Pollution Under Imperfect and Asymmetric Information," Staff General Research Papers Archive 10787, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    10. Cabe, Richard & Herriges, Joseph A., 1992. "The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 134-146, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Margrethe Aanesen & Claire W. Armstrong, 2016. "The Political Game of European Fisheries Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 745-763, April.
    2. Jensen, Frank & Nøstbakken, Linda, 2016. "A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries: liability rules and non-compliance," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 371-392, June.
    3. Abildtrup, Jens & Jensen, Frank, 2014. "The regulation of hunting: A game population based tax on hunters," Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, Editions NecPlus, vol. 95(03), pages 281-298, September.
    4. Jensen, Frank & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2016. "Designing hunting regulation under population uncertainty and self-reporting," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 157-171.
    5. Jens Abildtrup & Frank Jensen, 2012. "The Regulation of Hunting: A Population Tax," IFRO Working Paper 2012/2, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    6. Margrethe Aanesen & Claire Armstrong, 2013. "Stakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 320-338, June.

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