Hugging Trees: Claiming de Facto Property Rights by Blockading Resource Use
This paper explores conflicts between two groups,“the industry” and “theenvironmentalists”, over whether an indivisible resource (e.g., an ancient tree) should be harvested or preserved. In a complete information war ofattrition the environmentalists' willingness to blockade harvest attemptsmay control resource use as effectively as if they held property rights. Optimal government intervention will override this ability for somebenefit/cost combinations but may augment it for other combinations.Introducing uncertainty about the environmentalists' benefits results inextended disputes and consequent lack of efficiency. Governmentintervention for welfare reasons generally reduces these efficiencylosses. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004
Volume (Year): 27 (2004)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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