OPEC's Response to International Climate Agreements
This paper studies a game between a group of countries that have agreed to participate in an international climate agreement (the signatories) and OPEC. The purpose of the signatories is to design carbon taxes that maximize their total net income, given a goal on global carbon emissions. As a response to the climate agreement, OPEC imposes an oil tax on its member states that maximizes OPEC's profits. Within a numerical model we find the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a game in which each player chooses when to fix his decision variables. It is shown that in equilibrium the group of signatories chooses to be the leader and OPEC chooses to be the follower. It is demonstrated, however, that for both agents the order of move is of minor (numerical) importance. Hence, the players have limited incentives for strategic behaviour. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
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Volume (Year): 12 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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