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On Tax Over-Shifting in Wage Bargaining Models

Author

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  • Edward Calthrop
  • Bruno Borger

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Abstract

It has frequently been noted in the wage bargaining literature that increasing average labour taxes may in fact be over-shifted in the pre-tax wage that is negotiated between unions and firms, raising workers post-tax wages. In this paper, we study the precise conditions for such tax over-shifting to occur under both Nash and Right-To-Manage bargaining structures, and considering both competitive and imperfectly competitive output market conditions. In the case of competitive output markets, we derive and interpret the conditions for over-shifting to occur and show that they hold for an entire class of commonly used production functions. Moreover, under monopolistically competitive output markets we show that tax over-shifting will occur when the firm has sufficient market power. The conditions on the production function, that were necessary and sufficient for tax over-shifting to occur under perfect competition, are shown to be no longer necessary. These findings hold for all bargaining structures considered. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Edward Calthrop & Bruno Borger, 2007. "On Tax Over-Shifting in Wage Bargaining Models," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 35(2), pages 127-143, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:35:y:2007:i:2:p:127-143
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-007-9063-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hamilton, Stephen F., 1999. "Tax incidence under oligopoly: a comparison of policy approaches," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 233-245, February.
    2. Anderson, Simon P. & de Palma, Andre & Kreider, Brent, 2001. "Tax incidence in differentiated product oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 173-192, August.
    3. Pissarides, Christopher A., 1998. "The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; The role of unemployment benefits and tax structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 155-183, January.
    4. Koskela, Erkki & Schob, Ronnie, 1999. "Does the composition of wage and payroll taxes matter under Nash bargaining?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 343-349, September.
    5. Wu, Yangru & Zhang, Junxi, 2000. "Endogenous markups and the effects of income taxation:: Theory and evidence from OECD countries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 383-406, September.
    6. McDonald, Ian M & Solow, Robert M, 1981. "Wage Bargaining and Employment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(5), pages 896-908, December.
    7. Creedy, John & McDonald, Ian M, 1991. "Models of Trade Union Behaviour: A Synthesis," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 67(199), pages 346-359, December.
    8. Layard, Richard & Nickell, Stephen, 1986. "Unemployment in Britain," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 53(210(S)), pages 121-169, Supplemen.
    9. Lockwood, Ben, 1990. "Tax Incidence, Market Power, and Bargaining Structure," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 187-209, January.
    10. Lockwood, Ben & Manning, Alan, 1993. "Wage setting and the tax system theory and evidence for the United Kingdom," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 1-29, August.
    11. Bayindir-Upmann, Thorsten & Raith, Matthias G., 2003. "Should high-tax countries pursue revenue-neutral ecological tax reforms?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 41-60, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining models; Tax over-shifting; H20; J51;

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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