Tax Incidence, Market Power, and Bargaining Structure
This paper considers the incidence of both factor taxes and an income/consumption tax in a general equilibrium model with unionized labor markets and imperfectly competitive product markets, focusing especially on the implications of different bargaining structures in the labor market for tax incidence. The determinants of tax incidence are shown to be very different from the competitive case; in particular, more than 100 percent shifting of general, as opposed to sector specific wage and income/consumption taxes is possible, and the shifting of the wage tax generally increases, rather than decreases, with the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in production. Also, changes in firm market power and union bargaining power are shown to have counterintuitive effects on the degree of shifting of taxes. Copyright 1990 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 42 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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