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The Death of Labor Market Competition Has Been Greatly Exaggerated

Author

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  • Timothy Perri

    (Appalachian State University)

Abstract

I critique recent theoretical and empirical research that suggests that labor markets are not nearly as competitive as has generally been assumed. I argue that no-poaching agreements and covenants not to compete may reduce the number of competitors and thus the wage, but firms are still wage takers. This means the minimum wage will not increase employment.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy Perri, 2023. "The Death of Labor Market Competition Has Been Greatly Exaggerated," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 38(2), pages 39-54.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1947
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J42 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets

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