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The Implicit Costs of Government Deposit Insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Thomas L. Hogan

    (Rice University)

  • William J. Luther

    (Florida Atlantic Univeristy)

Abstract

Most people believe that the benefits of deposit insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) clearly exceed the costs. However, a growing literature suggests that the benefits of FDIC insurance are overstated while the costs are understated. We add to this literature by considering the implicit costs of government-provided deposit insurance. Specifically, we consider the costs arising from (1) an implicit taxpayer backstop and (2) suboptimal pricing. The implicit costs of government- provided deposit insurance are real economic costs borne by taxpayers, borrowers, lenders, and counterparties. Since such costs are routinely omitted from traditional cost-benefit analysis, most studies of the FDIC tend to be biased in favor of government-provided deposit insurance. ______________________________________________________

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas L. Hogan & William J. Luther, 2016. "The Implicit Costs of Government Deposit Insurance," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(2), pages 1-13.
  • Handle: RePEc:jpe:journl:1269
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "Introduction to "The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy"," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 1-12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Thomas L. Hogan & William J. Luther, 2014. "The Explicit Costs of Government Deposit Insurance," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 34(1), pages 145-170, Winter.
    5. Selgin, G., 1993. "In Defence of Bank Suspension," Papers 367, Georgia - College of Business Administration, Department of Economics.
    6. Darrell Duffie & Robert Jarrow & Amiyatosh Purnanandam & Wei Yang, 2008. "Market Pricing of Deposit Insurance," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Financial Derivatives Pricing Selected Works of Robert Jarrow, chapter 22, pages 551-577, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Neil Wallace, 1988. "Another attempt to explain an illiquid banking system: the Diamond and Dybvig model with sequential service taken seriously," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 12(Fall), pages 3-16.
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