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The Explicit Costs of Government Deposit Insurance

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  • Thomas L. Hogan
  • William J. Luther

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  • Thomas L. Hogan & William J. Luther, 2014. "The Explicit Costs of Government Deposit Insurance," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 34(1), pages 145-170, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:34:y:2014:i:1:p:145-170
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    1. Andolfatto, David & Nosal, Ed & Wallace, Neil, 2007. "The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 709-715, November.
    2. Steffen Sebastian & Marcel Tyrell, 2006. "Open End Real Estate Funds - Diamonds Or Danger?," ERES eres2006_301, European Real Estate Society (ERES).
    3. Van den Heuvel, Skander J., 2008. "The welfare cost of bank capital requirements," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 298-320, March.
    4. J. Huston McCulloch & Min-Teh Yu, 1998. "Government Deposit Insurance and the Diamond-Dybvig Model," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 23(2), pages 139-149, December.
    5. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    6. Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "Introduction to "The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy"," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 1-12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Samartin, Margarita, 2003. "Should bank runs be prevented?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 977-1000, May.
    8. Gorton, Gary, 1985. "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 277-283, June.
    9. Asl? Demirgüç-Kunt & Edward J. Kane & Luc Laeven (ed.), 2008. "Deposit Insurance around the World: Issues of Design and Implementation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262042541, December.
    10. Thomson, James B, 1987. "The Use of Market Information in Pricing Deposit Insurance," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 528-537, November.
    11. Claudia Goldin & Gary D. Libecap, 1994. "The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number gold94-1, October.
    12. repec:ucp:bknber:9780226301105 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Gorton, Gary & Mullineaux, Donald J, 1987. "The Joint Production of Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank Clearinghouses," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(4), pages 457-468, November.
    14. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Bank Portfolio Restrictions and Equilibrium Bank Runs," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000077, UCLA Department of Economics.
    15. James Peck & Karl Shell, 2003. "Equilibrium Bank Runs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 103-123, February.
    16. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Karacaovali, Baybars & Laeven, Luc, 2005. "Deposit insurance around the world : a comprehensive database," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3628, The World Bank.
    17. Calomiris, Charles W., 1990. "Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical Perspective," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 283-295, June.
    18. R. Alton Gilbert, 1990. "Market discipline of bank risk: theory and evidence," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jan, pages 3-18.
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    1. repec:jpe:journl:1269 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Daniel J. Smith, 2023. "Austrian economics as a relevant research program," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 36(4), pages 501-514, December.
    3. Nicholas A. Curott & Tyler Watts & Benjamin R. Thrasher, 2020. "Government-Cheerleading Bias in Money and Banking Textbooks," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 17(1), pages 1-98–151, March.
    4. Diyana Miteva, 2015. "The Contemporary Deposit Insurance through the Perspective of Bank Resolution and Moral Hazard," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 1, pages 81-90, March.

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    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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