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Adoption of Human Resources Management Policies for Practices: Harvard Model versus Religious Model

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  • Oginni Babalola
  • Erigbe Patience
  • Ojo Afolabi
  • Laosebikan, ¡®Sola
  • Ogunlusi, ¡®Femi

Abstract

The paper set out to explore two different models of Human Resources Management as a policy for practice that will be adequate for adoption by any organisation. The Harvard and Religious models were the two models critically examined vis ¨C a ¨C vis their implications on the practice of Human Resources Management (HRM). It was revealed that Harvard model of HRM is a content model as it is contingent on specific core issues (work system, reward system, employees¡¯ influence and flow of people) in human resources management while Religious model of HRM is a process model as it is based on identification of relationship among components units (management and employees) Harvard model of HRM as a policy is embedded in the organisation through congruence, commitment, cost effectiveness and competence and Religious model of HRM is anchored on value based ideology through morality, honesty, sincerity, fairness and integrity. The two models are practicable but Harvard model of HRM has no exception to a particular party in business organisation while Religious model of HRM is averse to development of trade union in organisation. Therefore, the adoption of the two models will make world of work conducive, however, Harvard model of HRM aligned more with the nature and belief of business. However, combination of the two models to give a contingency ¨C hybrid model will make the workplace to be better than adopting one of the models.?

Suggested Citation

  • Oginni Babalola & Erigbe Patience & Ojo Afolabi & Laosebikan, ¡®Sola & Ogunlusi, ¡®Femi, 2018. "Adoption of Human Resources Management Policies for Practices: Harvard Model versus Religious Model," Business and Management Research, Business and Management Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 7(1), pages 51-60, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:jfr:bmr111:v:7:y:2018:i:1:p:51-60
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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