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Vote Buying, Political Patronage and Selective Plunder

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  • Andrés Cendales

Abstract

This article introduces a political economy model for studying the relationship between the vote-buying strategy of a party that has won the mayoralty of a municipality in the last election and its preferences as the governing party on the municipal political space, given its desire to maintain its position. The main result is that the governing party prefers to promote, given its clientelistic structure, the political agendas with which it selectively impoverishes worse-of f (WO) individuals; this will allow that equilibrium prices in vote markets will be reduced in a next election, and therefore, it will help enable the governing party to achieve its objective of maintaining governmental power through its vote-buying strategy in the exchange network.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrés Cendales, 2012. "Vote Buying, Political Patronage and Selective Plunder," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 49(2), pages 237-276, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:ioe:cuadec:v:49:y:2012:i:2:p:237-276
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    Cited by:

    1. Cendales, Andrés & Mora, Jhon & Arroyo, Santiago, 2015. "Sobre las democracias locales en el Pacífico colombiano y su incidencia en la política pública de agua potable en el periodo 2008-2011," Revista Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, CIE, issue 83, pages 161-192, February.
    2. Andrés Cendales & Jhon James Mora, 2015. "Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 30(2), pages 305-339.
    3. Andrés Cendales & Jhon James Mora, 2015. "Sobornos o representación democrática: ¿qué promueven los concejos municipales en una democracia precaria en el nivel local?," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, March.
    4. Andrés Cendales & Jhon James Mora, 2014. "Precarious Democracies, Political Negotiation and Selective Predation," Documentos de Trabajo 12422, Universidad Católica de Colombia.
    5. Andrés Cendales & Jhon James Mora, 2014. "Sobornos o Representación Democrática: ¿Qué promueven los concejos municipales en una democracia precaria en el nivel local?," Documentos de Trabajo 12412, Universidad Católica de Colombia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Network games; vote buying; political patronage; poverty; political competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution

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