Poverty Reduction, Patronage, or Vote Buying? The Allocation of Public Goods and the 2001 Election in Madagascar
This article uses data from Madagascar to examine how an upcoming election or political patronage might induce governments to deviate from goals such as poverty reduction. Using a nationwide, commune-level data set, the article tests three competing explanations of how public goods are allocated across districts. Projects can be allocated on the basis of local need with the goal of reducing poverty or rewarding one's political base, or the desire to win votes for an upcoming election. The evidence from an analysis of three projects suggests that two of the three projects responded to local needs and a third seemed to be influenced by both election and patronage concerns. An analysis of the 2001 presidential election in Madagascar shows that voters do appear to reward the incumbent for projects received in their districts. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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Volume (Year): 57 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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