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On the Relative Performance of Linear vs. Piecewise-Linear-Threshold Intertemporal Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Joseph Y. Chen

    (TransAlta Corporation, Calgary, Alberta T2P 2M1, Canada)

  • Bruce L. Miller

    (Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California 90095)

Abstract

This paper employs numerical simulations to compare the relative performance of linear contracts with piecewise-linear-threshold contracts in the case where the agent chooses actions over time. These contracts are restricted to be functions of the ending value of aggregate output. We find strong evidence that only linear contracts need be considered in comparison with piecewise-linear-threshold contracts in the situation where cumulative output is only updated periodically and the agent's utility function is exponential. This finding holds even when there are only two periods and hence one change of action by the agent. However, we find that the best piecewise-linear-threshold contract is significantly superior to the best linear contract when the agent has a power utility function. These numerical simulations also call into question the use of a cap when the agent's compensation is based on the ending value of aggregate output and the agent's effort takes place over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Joseph Y. Chen & Bruce L. Miller, 2009. "On the Relative Performance of Linear vs. Piecewise-Linear-Threshold Intertemporal Incentives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(10), pages 1743-1752, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:55:y:2009:i:10:p:1743-1752
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1048
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. M Denuit & L Eeckhoudt & O Jokung, 2013. "Non-differentiable transformations preserving stochastic dominance," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 64(9), pages 1441-1446, September.
    2. Bakó, Barna & Kálecz-Simon, András, 2013. "Quota bonuses with heterogeneous agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(3), pages 316-320.

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