Investigation of the Relationship between Ownership–Control Discrepancy and Dividend Policy in Tehran Stock Exchange
Present research examines the relation between the ownership-control discrepancy the major shareholder and dividend policy in Tehran Stock Exchange. This research focuses on the effect of the conflicts of interests between majority shareholders and minority shareholders on firms’ dividend policy, because dividend policy can serve as a replacement for this the conflicts of interests. In this research, Investigation all firms in Tehran Stock Exchange that serves the annual reports for the years 2007 through 2010. In a total the selection 134 firms of different industries. The test of the proposed hypotheses conducted on a panel data. In a total research results show that the influence of the ownership to control ratio of the largest shareholder (OWCONT) on dividend payout rate is significantly positive. Indeed, the more this ratio is high, the more the control is low and payout is high. In contrast, if the largest shareholder has a controlling power that exceeds his/her cash flow right, payout is low. Furthermore, control power is significantly related to the dividend policy.
Volume (Year): 3 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hrmars.com/index.php/pages/detail/Accounting-Finance-Journal|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Luciana Mancinelli & Aydin Ozkan, 2006. "Ownership structure and dividend policy: Evidence from Italian firms," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 265-282.
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
" A Survey of Corporate Governance,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-83, June.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1741, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Larry H. P. Lang & Mara Faccio & Leslie Young, 2001. "Dividends and Expropriation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 54-78, March.
- Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
- Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2007.
"One Share - One Vote: The Theory,"
SIFR Research Report Series
57, Institute for Financial Research.
- Benjamin Maury & Anete Pajuste, 2011. "Private Benefits of Control and Dual‐Class Share Unifications," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(6), pages 355-369, 09.
- Gugler, Klaus & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2003. "Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in Germany," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 731-758, August.
- Truong, Thanh & Heaney, Richard, 2007. "Largest shareholder and dividend policy around the world," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 667-687, December.
- Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hur:ijaraf:v:3:y:2013:i:3:p:266-274. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hassan Danial Aslam)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.