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Profit-Sharing Contract of the Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain under Community Group Purchase Mode Considering Freshness Preservation Efforts

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  • Min Li

    (School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China
    Center of Comprehensive Transportation Economic Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China)

  • Zhen Lian

    (School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China)

  • Guangchuan Yang

    (Institute for Transportation Research and Education, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27606, USA)

  • Liaoning Li

    (School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China)

Abstract

This article constructed a four-level fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain with a two-stage pricing strategy under a “community group purchase (CGP) platform + direct procurement from the FAP supplier” sales model. We investigate the influence of the CGP agency’s participation in the control strategy of FAP freshness preservation efforts on the profits of supply chain stakeholders. This article discusses the effects of the FAP supplier profit-sharing ratio, the CGP agency profit-sharing ratio, and consumers’ sensitivity to FAP freshness on the supply chain stakeholders’ freshness preservation efforts. Moreover, based on the fairness preference theory, this article designed a profit-sharing contract that involves the Nash bargaining game between the FAP supplier and the CGP agency as the supply chain coordination mechanism. Modeling results revealed that: (1) The CGP agency’s freshness preservation efforts increased total supply chain profits. (2) The FAP supplier profit-sharing ratio, CGP agency profit-sharing ratio, and consumers’ sensitivity to FAP freshness have a positive correlation to the profits of the FAP supply chain and promote the coordination of the supply chain. (3) Considering fairness preferences, with the increase in FAP suppliers’ business negotiating ability, their freshness preservation efforts and fairness utility both increased gradually, while the fairness utility of the CGP agency gradually decreased.

Suggested Citation

  • Min Li & Zhen Lian & Guangchuan Yang & Liaoning Li, 2023. "Profit-Sharing Contract of the Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain under Community Group Purchase Mode Considering Freshness Preservation Efforts," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(9), pages 1-22, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:9:p:7572-:d:1139994
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    1. Haiping Ren & Rui Chen, 2023. "Porcelain Supply Chain Coordination Considering the Preferences of Consumers against the Background of E-Commerce," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-19, June.

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