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Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Participating Subjects in Remediation of Heavy Metal Contaminated Cultivated Land under the Ladder Multiple Supervision Model

Author

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  • Xiaoling Xiong

    (School of Business, Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha 410128, China
    Institute of Subtropical Agriculture, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Changsha 410125, China)

  • Jizhi Li

    (School of Business, Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha 410128, China)

  • Zejian Lin

    (Institute of Subtropical Agriculture, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Changsha 410125, China)

Abstract

The heavy metal pollution of cultivated land in China is severe, requiring remediation. Introducing third-party governance subjects representing market resources is inevitable to realize the specialization and socialization of cultivated land remediation. However, due to the public nature of cultivated land, the confusion about participating parties’ responsibilities and difficulty coordinating interests restrict the expected effect of cultivated land remediation. To this end, a three-party evolutionary game model among the grassroots government, governance enterprises, and supervisory enterprises is constructed and virtually simulated, taking into account the influence of random checks by the higher-level government. We found that the reward and punishment mechanism of the grassroots government, the frequency of random inspection by the higher-level government, and the amount of deduction will influence the strategy selection of the participating parties. Strengthening the awareness of the responsibility of the grassroots government, optimizing the incentive system, establishing a regular spot-check system, and improving the cost of non-compliance by enterprises can effectively resolve conflicts of interest among the participants. The study results have practical significance for further enhancing the remediation efficiency of heavy metal-contaminated cultivated land.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaoling Xiong & Jizhi Li & Zejian Lin, 2023. "Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis of Participating Subjects in Remediation of Heavy Metal Contaminated Cultivated Land under the Ladder Multiple Supervision Model," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-20, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:15:y:2023:i:6:p:4940-:d:1093258
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    References listed on IDEAS

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